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Abstract 
 
Personal information stored in large government 
databases is a prime target for criminals because of its 
potential use in identity theft and associated crime, 
such as fraud. In 2007-2008, a number of very high-
profile cases of data loss within the British 
Government, its departments and non-departmental 
bodies raised three pressing issues of public 
significance: (1) how broad was the loss across 
agencies; (2) how deep was each loss incident; and (3) 
what counter-measures (organisational and technical) 
could be put in place to prevent further loss? This 
paper provides a chronological review of data loss 
incidents, and assesses the potential to mitigate risk, 
given organisational structures and processes, and 
taking into account current government calls for 
further medium and long-term acquisition and storage 
of citizen’s private data. The potential use of the “lost” 
credentials is discussed in the context of identity theft.   
 
1. Introduction 
Governments are entrusted with our personal data 
for good and necessary reasons, such as the planning 
and provision of public services, determining eligibility 
for access to public services, and associated 
accountability of public expenditure. 
However, as governments acquire and store more 
personal data of their citizens, in order to provide 
better and more accountable services, are they securing 
our personal data effectively? The question can be 
posed from two distinct perspectives: (1) a privacy 
rights perspective, which seeks to enshrine an inherent 
right to privacy of personal data; and (2) a cybercrime 
perspective, which is concerned with the potential for 
misuse of large sets of credentials – if illegally obtained 
– for identity theft. While the first perspective is 
important, the focus of this paper is the potential for 
cybercrime, particularly the potential for identity theft. 
Given the proposed expansion of personal data 
holdings by the British government, the focus of this 
case study will be British government data loss. 
Numerous incidents of data loss across all branches 
of the UK government over the past two years, and 
several reviews have been initiated to ensure policy and 
procedure implementation. However, from an 
outsider’s perspective, it appears that each government 
branch is focused on devising their own reports and 
potentially their own solutions. This is a shame, since 
there are common lessons across government which 
can be learned. 
Two clear themes emerge from the chronology and 
analysis of data loss presented in Section 2: (1) many 
data loss incidents involved contractors, but there 
appears to have been little attempt to ensure 
compatibility of government and private sector 
policies; and (2) most lost data was not encrypted, 
there instead being a reliance on “password protection” 
and “registered mail” for confidentiality. Since 
cybercriminals are both innovative and opportunistic, 
ensuring consistency among access policies, as well as 
end-to-end confidentiality, would provide a basic level 
of security (but not privacy).    
While there was a lot of publicity in late 2007, and 
during 2008 about British government data loss, 
unfortunately the situation does not appear to be getting 
any better – for example, on 2/11/2008, an unencrypted 
USB memory stick containing passwords for access to 
the Government Gateway was found in a pub car park 
in Cannock, Staffordshire. The stick also contained 
source code for the site and security software. The 
Government Gateway controls access to 100 services 
including online tax returns and benefit claims, and has 
1.8 million users, so the potential pool of credentials 
available for identity crime is enormous. The 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) have 
reportedly found that an employee of Atos Origin – the 
outsourcing company running Government Gateway – 
lost the stick [1].  
For organised crime, obtaining these large sets of 
credentials is much easier than going committing 
resources to the more difficult enterprise of phishing 
[2]. 
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2. Data Loss Incidents 
In this section, I will outline some of the major data 
loss incidents that occurred during 2007-08, broken 
down by agency or department. It is useful to examine 
the practices and strategies from this perspective 
because of the individual remedies and responses that 
have been advocated and/or enacted within each branch 
of government, but not across the whole government. 
 
2.1. HMRC (HM Revenue & Customs) 
In September 2007, the personal details of 25 
million child benefit claimants were reportedly sent in 
the post to National Audit Office (NAO) by HMRC, 
using TNT [3]. The discs never subsequently 
recovered. The discs contained names, addresses, dates 
of birth, child benefit numbers, National Insurance 
numbers and bank or building society account details. 
This incident has caused created greater public 
awareness of the handling of sensitive, personal data by 
the public sector. 
The HMRC Chairman Paul Gray was forced to 
resign over the incident. Apparently, the data were not 
encrypted. Since this initial data loss – and despite 
significant adverse publicity - numerous examples of 
data loss have been reported across departmental and 
non-departmental government bodies over the past 12 
months. The potential for identity theft is enormous. 
For example, Avivah Litan (Gartner) suggests that bank 
account numbers sell for the highest price on the black 
market, somewhere between $30 and $400 [4]. 
Multiply this by 25 million customers, and the value 
on the black market is staggering. One possible remedy 
would be to rekey account numbers, but this would be a 
massive undertaking.  
While data breach notifications are mandatory in 
some US states (e.g., California), they are mandatory in 
the UK, so customers may not even know that their 
credentials have been lost by an organisation. There is 
an interim voluntary disclosure code in Australia, 
which may be modified in any future review of the 
Privacy Act [5]. 
Why was such a large download required by the 
National Audit Office (NAO)? NAO had previously 
used HMRC’s internal sample of 1,500 cases for fraud 
detection [6]. Larger scale checks were now required 
by new international auditing standards. The routine 
disc transfer started in March 07. NAO had suggested 
to HMRC that it remove the names of parents, their 
addresses and bank details – to save space, and not to 
prevent disclosure - but an HMRC official reportedly 
refused on the following grounds: 
 
“I must stress we must make use of [existing] data 
we hold and not overburden the business by asking 
them to run additional data scans/filters that may incur 
a cost to the department."1 
 
In November 2007, 15,000 customers of Standard 
Life had their banking and pension details lost. HMRC 
had sent them to Standard Life using a courier [7]. It 
took 5 weeks for HMRC to notify affected citizens. 
The courier collected discs but they were never 
delivered. 
 
2.2. Ministry of Justice 
The Ministry is the government department 
responsible for UK courts, prisons, probation, criminal 
law and sentencing [8]. In June 2007, three laptops 
were reportedly stolen which contained details of 
14,000 fine defaulters. The data were not encrypted, 
and there were no physical security measures on the 
computers within a secured facility. The data 
comprised names, dates of birth, addresses, offences 
and, national-insurance numbers.  
In December 2007, four CD’s were reportedly lost 
in the post. The discs were sent by “recorded delivery” 
but never delivered. HM Inspectorate of Court 
Administration (HMICA) will not confirm whether the 
data was encrypted [9].  
In July 2007, the Ministry lost a portable 500G 
hard-drive disk containing personal details of 5,000+ 
jail governors and guards [8]. The disk held names, 
dates of birth, national insurance, prison service 
employee numbers and addresses. It was apparently 12 
months before contractor EDS realised the disk was 
missing. The disc was sent to Mitcheldean, Gloucs, for 
testing in Washington, Wearside, on July 20 last year, 
subsequently moved to Telford, Shrops. 
 
2.3. National Health Service (NHS)  
In December 2007, service provider BT reportedly 
sent the names and addresses of children registered 
with the City and Hackney Teaching Primary Care 
Trust (CHTPCT) in the mail. The records were not 
delivered to a staff member at the destination hospital, 
and have never recovered. The records were given to a 
member of the public counter who was standing near 
the enquiries counter [10]. 
In February 2008, Russells Hall Hospital lost a 
laptop containing personal details of 5,123 patients, 
which had only password protection [11]. Other NHS 
                                                          
1
 Reported in The Times 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7106987.s
tm) 
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data losses have also been reported during the past year 
by [10]: 
 Bolton Royal Hospital 
 Sutton and Merton Trust 
 Sefton Merseyside Trust 
 Mid-Essex Trust 
 Norfolk and Norwich Trust 
 Gloucester Partnership Foundation 
Trust (historical data) 
 Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
Trust (2 cases) 
 East and North Hertfordshire Trust  
(recovered) 
The total combined annual loss exceeds 168,000 
records. 
 
2.3. Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP)  
In December 2007, personal data of 45,000 people 
claiming benefits in West Yorkshire were reportedly 
lost. Data included names, dates of birth and national 
insurance numbers [12]. A search of the home of a 
former contractor also revealed personal records 
relating to thousands of benefit claimants [13].  
 
2.4. Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
In January 2008, approximately 600,000 personal 
records of recruits or potential recruits were reportedly 
stolen from a laptop running the Training 
Administration and Financial Management (TAFMIS) 
system, from a Royal Navy recruiter in Birmingham 
[14]. In October 2008, a portable hard drive containing 
names, addresses, passport numbers and driver's license 
details of 100,000 serving British military personnel 
was also lost.  
Full replication of TAFMIS on laptops is 
apparently common for off-line recruiters [15].  
In September 2008, a disc carrying sensitive 
personnel information was stolen from a military base.  
Details of all current and ex-RAF personnel and their 
children - stored on three USB-connected storage 
drives - were also stolen from a base in Gloucestershire 
[16]. 
 
2.5. MI-5 and MI6 
In October 2008, a palmtop MI-5 computer was 
reportedly stolen through an open window in 
Manchester, reportedly containing information on 
terrorism [17]. 
In October 2008, an eBay sale of a digital camera 
revealed data reportedly owned by the SIS. The 
camera’s memory contained details of suspected al-
Qaeda members and their fingerprints, as well as other 
pictorial intelligence [18]. 
 
2.5. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
In February 2008, the CPS reportedly lost a disc 
of hundreds of DNA crime scene profiles sent by Dutch 
authorities, as part of Operation Thread. The disc has 
since been recovered, but the resulting investigation 
revealed a series of small errors which together led to 
the data being misplaced for a significant period of 
time. 
 
2.6. Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA) 
In December 2007, a hard drive in Iowa was 
reportedly lost containing details of 3,000,000 learner 
drivers. The data were stored by Pearson Driving 
Assessments [19]. In a separate incident, the DVLA 
lost 7,685 records including vehicle keeper name, 
address, registration mark of the vehicle, chassis 
number, make and colour, for drivers registered in 
Northern Ireland [20]. 
 
2.7. The Home Office 
In February 2008, a Home Office disk was 
reportedly found hidden in a laptop computer that had 
been sold on eBay. The CD was found wedged 
between the keyboard and circuit board of the laptop 
[21].  
Separately, from the J Track offender monitoring 
system, the names, addresses and dates of birth of 
around 33,000 offenders in England and Wales were 
reportedly lost on a memory stick [22]. 
Also reportedly lost were the names and dates of 
birth of 10,000 priority offenders. The names, dates of 
birth and, in some cases, the expected prison release 
dates of all 84,000 prisoners held in England and 
Wales [22].  
The contractor – PA Consulting - who reportedly 
lost the data, also worked on the government’s new ID 
card project. 
 
2.8. Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Office 
In June 2008, the Secretary for local government 
Hazel Blears reportedly had an unencrypted computer 
stolen from her constituency offices in Salford, which 
included some restricted, but no top-secret information 
[23]. Also in June 2008, two documents marked 
SECRET were reportedly left on a train from Waterloo 
to Surrey. The documents were stored in a bright 
orange cardboard envelope, contained details of 
government actions against al-qaeda in Pakistan and 
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Iraq, and were marked for UK, US, Canadian and 
Australian eyes only" [24]. 
 
2.9. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
In August 2008, the personal details of around 
250 children being stored on a memory stick were 
reportedly stolen from a car belonging to a member of 
staff at Objective Productions [25]. 
 
2.10. General Teaching Council (GTC) 
In September 2008, the personal data of 11,423 
teachers reportedly went missing on a disc, en-route to 
the organisation's office in Birmingham [26]. 
 
2.11. Insolvency Service 
In September 2008, a laptop containing the 
personal details of almost 400 former directors of 
insolvent companies was reportedly stolen during a 
burglary at the Insolvency Service office in Manchester 
[27]. 
 
2.12. Kirklees Council 
In September 2008, a Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) server reportedly bought from Ebay had links to 
private council documents. The server contained the 
necessary passwords to download these documents on 
council’s servers [28]. 
 
3. Security Reviews and Countermeasures 
As a result of these data loss incidents, a number 
of policy and procedure changes have been enacted 
across different government agencies. For example, the 
Cabinet Office has mandated that no more than 1,000 
personally-identifiable records be transported together. 
In addition, a number of reviews have been conducted 
to try and identify any systematic failings which may 
have contributed to the data loss. The two major 
reviews are the Poynter Review [29] of the HMRC data 
loss incident, and the Burton Review [15] of the MOD 
data loss incidents. 
Poynter’s Review makes interesting reading. He 
believes that the loss of data was “entirely avoidable” 
and the result of “serious institutional deficiencies”. He 
notes an “absence of proper training”, and “muddled 
accountability” for the ownership and guardianship of 
data. There was also “no visible management of data 
security at any level”. HMRC’s information security 
policies were inadequate, and those that they had were 
unduly complex, and not adequately translated into 
guidance for employees to actually use.  
It’s important to note that both organisational and 
technical failures contributed to the HMRC data loss. 
HMRC business processes had been designed for paper 
not computers, and the organisation suffered from low 
staff morale and complex organisational structures. 
PAYE, National Insurance, Child Benefit and Tax 
Credits all had their own systems, each of which 
contained a separate customer record, and which had 
separately developed and maintained security policies 
and procedures which may not have always been 
consistent. 
Poynter made a number of recommendations for 
change at HMRC. In terms of technical counter-
measures, obligatory use of protective measures (such 
as encryption and penetration testing) and controls (for 
example on use of mobile devices or on access to 
records) have been recommended. At the 
organisational level, a change in culture – with an aim 
to protect all personal data, and a recognition that some 
data needs more protection than other data – was 
suggested. The proper use of personal information 
includes both service planning and delivery.  
Mandatory training for those working with or managing 
protected personal information was also suggested, and 
appropriate censures and punishments – in response to 
a failure to apply protective measures – be applied, 
leading ultimately to dismissal.  
Poynter also suggested that approaches to 
information risk across government be standardised 
and enhanced, and that security and privacy of 
government-held data should be based around 
“information charters”. The public should also be made 
aware of government use and handling of their data. 
On examining the data loss incidents in Section 2, 
it is clear that the attacks have a number of common 
characteristics which have standard countermeasures. 
However, others – such as carelessness – are harder to 
proscribe. Confidential paper files left on trains and 
USB sticks left in pub car parks are both tricky 
problems – better physical measures to prevent the 
removal of paper files from secure premises, and end-
to-end confidentiality through encryption would have 
helped in both cases2. Also, where there has been 
involvement of external contractors, there appears to 
have been little effort to ensure compliance with 
government confidentiality requirements. Ensuring that 
all contractors who handle any identifying information 
about citizens are compliant with at least a baseline 
government standard would be a starting point – 
especially if the requirement for compliance is 
identified at the pre-tender qualification stage for large 
                                                          
2
 Note that – in the case of countermeasures such as 
encrypted USB sticks for data transfer – steps should 
be taken to ensure that data is recoverable in the case of 
a lost or misremembered password! 
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government projects. Alternatively, the adoption of 
Sarbanes-Oxley-style legislation to ensure that CEOs 
ultimately take responsibility for security breaches 
would provide a strong incentive for adherence to 
mandatory security requirements. 
In terms of personally identifying data, this should 
be removed from individual data records, if there is no 
requirement to identify individuals. For example, 
aggregated data may be used by local government for 
planning purposes. Also, the principles of least 
privilege and separation of duties must be rigorously 
enforced, and the least amount of data that is necessary 
to be transferred between parties to fulfil a specific 
requirement should be estimated in advance. 
 
4. Risk and Vulnerability 
 There is no evidence that the personal data lost in 
any of these incidents has resulted in identity theft – 
but, in the case of HMRC, it would be difficult to 
attribute theft to this source, since it includes the 
majority of adults living in Britain.  
One of the major concerns arising from the data 
loss is that the British government is set on greatly 
expanding the type and quality of data held about 
individuals. For example, the new £12b e-records 
system for the NHS will make all patient records 
accessible from anywhere in the country [30]. A Green 
record will be available to any legitimate NHS user and 
to the patient through HealthSpace. An Amber record 
will only available if patient gives the clinician 
permission at the time of the consultation and the 
patient can view it on HealthSpace. A Red record will 
not be available on the system or on HealthSpace. 
While this level of access control is admirable, if the 
security of data handling at the organisational level 
does not match the technical controls, then data may be 
exposed or lost. For example, if the clinician actually 
lets their secretary access their computer system, or if 
system or database administrators are given free access 
to underlying file systems or databases, then there is 
potential for data leakage.  
A more ambitious program is GCHQ 
Interception Modernisation Programme [31], which 
would provide SIS, MI-5 and police with access to 
every text, email and website visit to website made by 
anyone in the UK. Currently, MI-5 must obtain a 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) warrant 
via the Home Office to collect and access this data. A 
centralised database would lower the cost of viewing 
communications traffic/data as required, and make the 
important task of fighting crime and preventing 
terrorism easier. However, the same questions about 
the NHS database could also be asked here.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The widespread loss of personal data within the British 
government – including any identifiers used as primary 
keys in government databases, or whose contents could 
be used to satisfy “identity tests” – is worrying. If this 
data was obtained by organised crime groups, it could 
clearly be used – in total - to take over the majority of 
identities of the adult British population, especially the 
details lost in the HMRC incident. The minimum 
estimate of the number of lost records of cases 
reviewed in this paper is 29,586,917. This data could 
also be used to facilitate various kinds of fraud, since 
artefacts of the strong proof of identity – such as bank 
accounts – were also disclosed.  
As governments seek to acquire more and more 
personal data about their citizens – often with the best 
of intentions – we need to ask what additional 
safeguards will be put in place to protect our data. If 
existing technological countermeasures are not 
sufficient, could newer systems – such as the Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) – make a difference? 
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